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INTRODUCTION
This study was undertaken as a contributing project to North Central
Regional Project No. 25 entitled "Adjustments in Livestock Marketing in
the North Central States to Changing patterns of production and Consumption."
One of the anticipated products of the NCM 25 project is an indication of
the probable future changes in packing plant location and interregional
trade in meat as derived on the basis of economic criteria. Recognizing
the possibility that the existence of legal and institutional barriers to
plant location and interregional trade could have relevance to the changes
suggested by economic criteria, a study was undertaken to discover and
evaluate such barriers. The Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station was
assigned the responsibility of carrying out this project.
DEFINITIONS
Before attempting to determine the legal and institutional barriers
to interregional trade and meat packing plant location it is of primary
importance to define v.hat is meant by the terms posed in this research
project. A legal barrier is construed to mean any governmental enactment,
whether federal, state or local, that tends to limit or prohibit the
physical location of a meat packing plant in a given area; or to hinder or
prohibit trade across state lines.
In a technical sense legal enactments are institutions. Therefore
a legal barrier would also be classified as an institutional barrier. As
used in this study, however, there may be institutional barriers which
are not legal enactments. These could be such things as custom, tradition
or religious belief. An example of the latter might be the Orthodox
Jewish religious stipulation that meat should be consumed within a specified
number of hours following slaughter. This has tended to encourage the
location of slaughter plants nearer heavy Jewish centers of consumption
than otherwise might be the case.
Interregional trade may be defined as commerce between states but
it does not refer to trade within a state. Meat packing plant location
is the actual site or physical location of the establishment. A meat
packing plant is a firm that does slaughtering and slaughter-and-processing.
Meat Packer Clarified
In general usage, the term "packing company" is usually meant to
include the slaughtering firm, the processing firm and the slaughtering-
and processing firm. However, in the meat industry, meat packers refers
generally to the slaughtering and slaughtering-and-processing firms.
Meat processors do not slaughter livestock but purchase their meats at
wholesale for further processing and sale to retail trade. Meat processors
include sausage makers, canners, boners, makers of frozen meat specialty
portions, etc.
Large meat packers are classified primarily by their amount of annual
sales, whereas the terms applied to smaller meat packers are usually governed
by their annual volume. The meat industry regards national packers as
those slaughter-processor firms that have national distribution of their
product, and obtain sales of over §100 million annually. Regional packers
have annual sales between $15 and $100 million, while sectional packers i have
annual sales between %J> and $15 million.
Wholesale packers slaughter more than 2 million pounds per year and/or
are federally inspected; while local packers distribute products in the
immediate area and slaughter between 300,000 and 2 million pounds per year
(and have less than 53 million in annual sales). Individual packers not
connected with national or regional packers are termed independent whole-
sale packers. Butchers and froaen food-locker companies that slaughter
less than 300,000 pounds annually are generally not regarded as meat packers.
The functions of the packer are : (1) to slaughter the livestock;
(2) to dress, cure, process, and can the meat; (3) to convert or dispose
of by-products; (4) to store perishable and nonperishable meat products;
and (5) to distribute meat and meat products.
FACTORS AFFECTING INTERREGIONAL TRADE
AND MEAT PACKING PLANT LOCATION
Many authors writing in the field of location economics state that
there are many considerations which influence all prospective plant
builders. These factors include materials used in production, nearness
to markets, availability of labor and the quality of labor, means of
transportation, power and fuels, and availability of desirable sites.
For most firms these factors dominate the location process.
The prospective builder can ascertain some of the fixed liabilities
facing his firm by examining status of the tax structure. Beside the
property tax, there are other business taxes such as the general franchise
tax, state income tax, sales and license taxes, occupation taxes in some
states, severence taxes, and in some states discriminatory taxes.
Several studies1 indicate that taxation differentials do not represent
hfi, L. Greenhut, "Observation's and Motives to Industry Location,"
Southern Economic Journal, p. 227.
much of a "pull" in industrial location. The State planning Board of the
State of Indiana states:
(We) have amassed a great deal of inforjaation pertaining
to industry and employment it is our opinion that taxation
has but little to do with the location or shift into or out of the
State as compared to other factors as labor, nearness to markets,
nearness to raw materials, transportation facilities, and induce-
ments held out by various local Cliambers of Commerce. There has
been but very little movement of industry either into or out of the
Stat© and of this© none has bean dua to taxation that w@ know or,1
It appears that personal considerations play an important role in
selecting a plant location. A study in Alabama revealed that despite
the fact that factor costs would have been lower elsewhere the proprietor
felt that contract advantages were greater in the city where the owner was
raised and had his business apprenticeship. Also, bankers in the home
town were acquainted with the owner of the firm and would probably advance
credit more readily than would be expected at other possible locations.
Another important consideration is that life-long residents of the city will
not only buy from the people they know but will also recommend the firm to
others. This is a real advantage because many sales are effected through
buyers who are recommended to the firm in question by the leaders of the
community.
A study involving the food industry was conducted in Florida.-^ The
firms comprising the food and kindred products and preferring location
-J. D. Garwood, "Taxes and Industrial Location," National Tax journal,
Vol. No. 5. Dec, 1952. p. 367.
2Greenhut, op_. cit
., p. 227.
^M. L. Greenhut, "Underdeveloped Areas Offer plant Location Advantages,"
Industrial Development and Manufacturer ' s Record . Vol. 129, December I960,
p. 93-97.
in developed counties differed substantially in their location factor
selection from those firms locating in underdeveloped counties, size of the
plant (see table 1) made no difference at all in this respect. Thirty-
eight companies of the fifty-two locating in developed counties selected
the demand factors (access to market or anticipation of growth of markets)
as the main determinant » Five were influenced by climate, seven by low
freight costs or raw materials
.
Where raw materials were more expensive
to transport than finished products, location near a source of materials
enables a firm to cut its cost and to sell in markets at more favorable
prices than will firms that fail to gain this advantage.
The conclusion reached was that canneries and other packers of foods
(including meat) tend to locate near raw materials, and are not concerned
with the stage of county development, being in fact very willing to locate
in underdeveloped places.
CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY
The purpose of this section is to present the scope of the meat industry
and the changes in the location and size of meat packing plants that have
taken place over the years from 1955 to I960. Possible reasons for the
shifts in the structure of the meat industry are elaborated on throughout
this paper—reasons that are at least partially attributable to barriers
in either meat packing plant location or interregional trade, or both, that
will be discussed later—but for the present this discussion will concern
itself only with the actual changes in the meat industry and not with the
reasons for the changes.
Table 1. Plant location in developed and underdeveloped counties in
Florida.
Factors
0-24 25-99 1CO-499 500-Over Total
Dev. Und. Dev. Und. Dev. Und. Dev. und. Factors
Food and Kindred products
Access to markets 27 1 1 • 29
Anticipation of grovrth
of market 10 10
Lov; sellers mill price
on raw material 1 1 2
Lov; freight costs to
obtain raw material 5 2 7 13 1 19
Climate as attraction
to top management 5 1 6
Total 66
Source: Industrial Development and Manufacturer ' s Record,
developed Areas offer Plant Location Advantages" by M. L.
Vol. No. 129, Dec. I960, p. 95.
"Ur.der-
, Greenhut,
The folloviing table brealcs the states of the United States down by
sections and indicates the trends taking place. As shown by Table 2,
the number of slaughtering plants in the United States has dropped from
3,217 in 1955 to 3,114 in i960. These were plants slaughtering over
300,0C0 pounds, live weight, annually. Although the total number of
plants has declined the number under federal inspection has increased in
every section of the country and in all but 15 states.
To briefly summarize the major points presented, Table 2 indicates
that New England is declining as a slaughter- area. According to a circular
published by the University of California1 there was a 15 per cent decline
in livestock production; a 20 per cent decline in the number of slaughter
plants j and a 27 per cent decline in slaughter, between 1955 and 1959.
The Lliddle Atlantic New England and Middle Atlantic regions must depend
upon transportation of livestock because, other than diary cattle, quality
meat is not produced in sufficient quantities. Thus, because of trans-
portation costs, the prospects of increasing livestock slaughter in both
of these regions appears dismal.
The number of slaughtering plants declines in the East North Central
region which is second in total slaughter, but the average slaughter per
plant rose between 1955 and 1959. The leading region in total slaughter,
the West North Central area, gained between 1955 and I960 largely due to
the increase that took place in Kansas. Although there is some doubt that
o
this region will remain a major slaughtering area. The substantial increase
Allen B. Richards and Peggy J. Biaggi, California and united states
^Igat Packing Industry
,
Division of Agricultural sciences, university of
California, Circular 518, January, 1963, p. 10.
2Ibid., p. 10.
Table 2. Number of slaughtering establishments,-:;- March 1955 &
8
I960.
Under Other Commercial^ Total
State* Federal Establishments
Inspection Large Medium
1955 I960 1955 I960 1955 I960 1955 I960
New England 19 14 18 13 55 46 92 73
Middle Atlantic
New York 23 30 36 29 80 65 139 124
New Jersey 17 17 10 8 36 31 63 56
Pennsylvania 21 26 87 92 217 228 325 346
Total "61 73 B3 129 333 324" 327 326"
East North Central
Ohio 29 32 83 81 133 125 245 238
Indiana 14 13 33 23 89 87 136 123
Illinois 32 39 30 22 73 49 135 110
Michigan 4 4 82 87 113 103 199 194
Wisconsin 17 19 30 12 12 26 59 57
Total -% i&7 %& 225" "P"J 390 774" 722
West North Central
Minnesota 10 12 9 2 24 17 43 31
Iowa 21 27 7 9 21 15 49 51
Missouri 13 17 26 23 20 24 59 64
North Dakota 2 — 2 3 7 7 11 10
South Dakota 6 7 2 3 9 5 17 15
Nebraska 12 29 11 7 21 22 50 58
Kansas 16 16 12 12 33 55 61 83
Total 26" 138* w 3? 13T H"5" 2^0" 312
South Atlantic
Delaware-Maryland 11 10 17 16 39 22 67 48
Virginia 9 12 12 11 25 19 46 42
West Virginia — — 12 13 20 25 32 38
North Carolina 2 3 33 29 65 55 100 87
South Carolina 1 5 11 13 34 32 46 50
Georgia 7 5 33 3B 48 56 88 99
Florida 4 6 26 19 36 29 66 54
Total 34" 4"X Wi 139 267 233 413. 412
-^Includes all plants with 300,000 pounds or more live weight annually.
+IIew England includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont
,
Massachuse tts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut
. D. C. is included in Delaware and Maryland.
^Other commercial or nonfederally inspected plants.
Source: U.S. Dept. of Agr., No. of livestock slaughter plants, Mar. 1, I960.
Wash., D. C, I960., p. 5.
Table 2. (Cont.) Number of slaughtering establishments,-::- March 1955 & I960.
Under Other Commercial"^ Total
State Federal Establishments
Insoection Large Medium
1955 I960 1955 196C i 1955 196C 1 1955i I960
South Central
Kentucky- 7 7 18 21 21 20 46 48
Tennessee 9 9 24 22 33 41 71 72
Alabama 4 6 11 16 47 34 62 56
Mississippi 3 5 5 6 24 22 32 33
Arkansas 2 4 12 13 37 38 51 55
Louisiana 2 4 14 20 57 58 73 82
Oklahoma
-3 3 27 37 39 25 69 65
Texas 22 30 75 71 121 119 218 220
Total 32 o8 1*55 ZUo "M 557 "SZ2 oil
Mountain
Montana 4 5 9 10 19 17 32 32
Idaho 5 6 9 11 20 3B 34 55
Wyoming 1 1 — 2 10 7 11 10
Colorado 12 14 12 10 17 20 41 44
New Mexico -- 1 2 3 16 22 18 26
Arizona 1 1 9 9 3 7 13 26
Utah 4 6 10 8 16 12 30 26
Nevada 2 2 —
—
— 4 3 6 5
Total ^ 3T 5T "53 1JDT 126" 1ST 215'
Pacific
•'.ashington 13 15 19 17 56 41 88 73
Oregon 9 9 21 13 33 34 63 56
California 56 59 53 48 22 11 131 118
Total 7S s? 13 7Z ur 35 2o2 257
U.S. Total 455 530 952 902 1810 1712 3217 3144
.
^Includes all plants with 300,000 pounds or more live weight annually.
^"Other commercial or nonfederally inspected plants..
Source: U.S. Dept. of Agr., No. of Livestock slaughter plants, Mar. 1, I960.
V/ash., D. C, I960., p. 5.
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in the number of plants in the Mountain region was due to an increase in
only four states: Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico and Arizona. Montana
remained unchanged.
Despite the fact that the Delaware-Maryland section is deficient in
livestock, the other states in the South Atlantic region produced more
livestock than they slaughtered between 1955 and 1959. By the same token,
Tennessee was the only state that did not produce more livestock than it
slaughtered in the South Central region.
The future of the packing industry in the South Central region as
well as in the entire Southern section of the United States depends heavily
upon the prospective location of livestock production. An increase in
the number of slaughtering plants is expected if the South continues as
a surplus area of livestock production.
Viewing the United States as a whole, most regions have shown a
decrease in slaughtering plants even though some areas or regions are
experiencing an increase.
PSDCEDUEE AND SOURCES OF INJOHiATIQK
The nature of this study necessitated (1) an exhaustive search of
literature and (2) extensive correspondence with original sources of
information. Several studies were known to have been made on barriers
to interregional trade, though none were known with particular reference
to trade in meat or livestock. Many publications were also known to
be in existence concerning plant location. In general they emphasize
economic and physical factors but, nevertheless, many were reviewed for
possible hints or clues to legal and institutional factors.
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The search was begun in the Kansas State University library by using
the following indices;
1) United States Code (January 6, 1959)
2) Code of Federal Regulations (complete as of January 1, 1962)
3) Agricultural Index (1954-1961)
4) Applied Science and Technology Index (1958-June 1962)
5) Business periodicals Index (1958-1961)
6) Public Affairs Information Bulletin (1958-1961)
7) Index of Economic Journals (1954-1959)
In addition to the above mentioned sources a search was made of the
card catalogue at the same library.
Because this paper is concerned with the legal aspects of meat pacicing
plant location and interregional trade, and because the Kansas state
University does not have an extensive legal library, a thorough search was
undertaken at the State Legislative Library in Topeka, Kansas. V'ith the
aid of two legally trained librarians the following publications were
searched:
1) Index to Legal Periodicals (1948-1962)
2) United States Code (1962)
3) United States Government publications (1959-Movember, 1962)
4) Harvard Business Review (1958-1962)
5) Public Affairs Information Service (1961-1962)
With the aid of the State Legislative librarians court cases were
searched as a source of information concerning meat packing plants and
interregional trade.
In addition to the search in the two libraries, much benefit was
derived from direct interviews with personnel employed by the federal and
state governments who are knowledgeable on the subject concerning barriers
to interregional trade and meat pacicing plant location.
Those persons interviewed were;
1) Dr. S. J. Couger (Federal Veternarian)
2) Br. J. F. Huddleson (Kansas Veternarian)
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3) Dr. D.O. Manley (USDA official in the disease and eradication
field)
4) Mr. A. G. Pickett (State Livestock Sanitation commissioner)
5) Kansas Industrial Development Corporation
6) Kansas Board of Health
Every issue of a -weekly meat industry magazine, The National provisioner,
was thoroughly scrutinized from 1954 to 1963. Many references were dis-
covered in this source which opened the way for further probing, in
addition, a personal letter was sent to each of the following asking for
information on the subject:
1) Railroads
a-Assoelation of American Railroads
b-National Public Relations Association
2) Trucking Organizations
a-American Trucking Association
b-United Truck Owners of America
3) Interstate Commerce Commission
a-Bureau of Rates and practices
b-Bureau of Traffic
c-Bureau of Motor Carriers
d-Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics
4) Federal Trade Commission
a-Director of Public Information
b-Legal Advisor on Antimonopoly
c-Bureau of Restraint of Trade
5) Labor Department
a-Secretary of Labor
b-Bureau of Labor Statistics
c-Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations
d-Director of the Office of Information
6) Military
a-Office of Information Director (Air Force)
b-Special Assistant for Procurement (Army)
c-Defense Subsistance Supply Center
d-Surgeon General of Public Health
7) Meat packing Companies
a-John Morrell & Co.
b-Geo. A. Hormell & Co.
c-Hygrade Food Products Corp.
d-Rath Packing Co.
e-Swift & Co.
f-Wilson & Co., Inc.
g-Cudahy Packing Co.
h-Armour & Co.
8) United States Department of Agriculture
a-Packers and Stockyards Division
b-rStaff Officer for Contracts and Enforcement
c-LTeat Inspection Division
d-Packer Branch, Packer and Stockyards Division
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9) Others
a-American Meat Institute
b-Economics Research Council
C-AFL-&0
d-The National Provisioner
e-Industrial Development Corporation of all 50 states,
Puerto Pico and the Virgin Islands
f-Department of Commerce, Information office
g-3ec. of Health Education, and Welfare
h-YJater Supply and pollution Control Division
The response from these letters prompted further correspondence and a
formal questionnaire to all persons, agencies and organizations listed
above, with the addition of the State Boards of Health in all 50 states,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, asking specific questions in the
area that person was associated with that dealt,- with some aspect of possible
legal and institutional barriers in interregional trade and meat packing
plant location.
RESULTS OF THE SURVEY
YJhere a company should locate a plant is a very perplexing question
that is of utmost importance. The factors that are important in selecting
a plant site vary with each individual but there are some common denominators,
While these "common denominators 11 are not all peculiar to meat packers
alone, one of the chief concerns of this research project does involve
the location of meat packing companies; therefore, as stated in the procedure
and Sources of Information section, questionnaires were sent to some of the
larger meat packing companies to ascertain what they felt were the primary
factors to be considered in the selection of a plant site. The response
to this question can be roughly categorized into three classes: (1) economic
and physical factors; (2) symptoms of a bad business climate; and (3) the
lack of uniformity of the food laws of the states. The economic and physical
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factors v:ere lumped together into one class because of their close interrela-
tionship; and the third class, the lack of uniformity of the food laws of
the states, will be dealt with more extensively in a later section.
The following are the economic and physical factors that the management
personnel of the major meat packing companies deemed to be the primary
considerations when choosing a plant site for a branch of their company.
1. An adequate supply of livestock in the plant area. Because it
is considerably cheaper to transport the carcass than live weight it is
more important to locate as close as possible to the source of supply of
the raw material than to locate near the point of consumption. LTore will
be stated about this subject later in this paper under the heading of
Transportation Costs in both Federal and State Barriers section.
2. A favorable consumer market potential in the immediate plant area.
Of course, it is highly desirable to have your cake and eat it, too. if
at all possible meat packing plants are established where they have both
an abundant supply of livestock and a large immediate consumer market.
3. An adequate supply of labor, with good work attitudes to fill
employment needs. The packers state that it is not necessary to make the
size of the community a factor in itself as long as there is an abundant
supply of labor in the surrounding area. However, it is most desirable
if the supply of labor can be drawn from the community in which the plant
is located.
4. Some packers stated that not only is an abundant water supply
necessary but also a stream with sufficient year around flow to accommodate
pre-treated effluent from the plant.
5. Adequate facilities for sewage treatment and reasonable laws
affecting waste disposal. The ramification of sewage disposal, water
15
pollution, and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act will be dealt
with more extensively later in this paper under the heading of Sewage
Disposal.
6. Freedom from floods.
7. A favorable supply of power commodities—coal, oil, gas, electricity,
etc. The price of these power cccmoditias i§ also a determining factor
in plant location.
8. Availability of efficient rail and truck service. Commensurate
with this criteria is the necessity for reasonable access to all-weather
roads and direct access to rail connections. Because a meat packing plant
survives only through the transportation of its products it is of utmost
importance that the availability of both truck and rail facilities be
sufficient, efficient and as low in cost as possible. Because of the
importance of this factor this subject will also be dealt with more
extensively later under the heading of Transportation Costs.
9. Fair tax rates, both state and local, that affect the plant, its
products, as well as the property and income of the employees, it may
be noted that the packers do not object to paying taxes—or even high
taxes—as long as the tax is not a discriminatory one and as long as the
benefits are proportional to the amount paid.
10. Not only must the plant site be free of floods and have good
access to all-weather roads and rail connections but it must also be
located in an area where a relatively large tract of land can be obtained
at a reasonable price. Packers have found that single story plants are
more efficient than multi-storied plants—and that it is more profitable
in the long-run to obtain a single story plant on the outskirts of a
16
city that allows plenty of room for parking and expansion than to
locate near the center of a city and operate a multi-storied plant.
The meat packers also indicated that there were several intangible
factors—factors that are not readily observed—that deserve as much
consideration as the more readily observed factors. These subtle idiosyn-
cracies of each community which packers deem symptoms of a bad business
climate are:
1. A "soak business" attitude. The old adage, "You can't get
something for nothing" certainly applies here. Many cities offer extremely
attractive incentives to induce new firms to locate in their community,
through tax incentives, free land or plant structures, etc. But in the
end the city has to obtain a return on its investment—it has to get out
of the new firm at least as much, and undoubtedly more, than the original
investment in some way or another or else the city would not offer the
incentive in the first place. The method of obtaining the return on the
city's investment is the crux of this discussion. If the city government
intends that the benefits accrued to the city should be long-run in nature—
when the return is yielded through increased jobs, flow of money, etc.
—then
the community would be an advantageous location, other things being equal.
Bit it becomes quite another matter if the return is intended to be short-run
in nature which would probably mean excessively high or discriminatory
taxation
.
2. Irresponsible union leadership—the union official must not be
determined to be the master instead of the servant of the employees.
Commensurate with this factor is union trouble, such as strikes, juris-
dictional disputes, secondary boycotts, featherbedding, etc., which are
17
all criteria that need full consideration when choosing a plant site.
More information will be stated on this subject under the' heading of
Labor Unions.
3. Abuses in unemployment and workmen's compensation administration
is a hidden factor that can cause a company much trouble and cost a great
deal of money in the long-run.
4. Inadequate law enforcement. Because most plants have invested a
great deal in capital equipment it is very important that this investment
is adequately protected.
5. Low individual productivity. Innumerable factors may cause the
average productivity of the source of labor that is intended to be tapped
to be low.
6. Inadequate schools, housing, public transportation and vital
facilities are important to the employees of the plant. Employee satis-
faction and well-being cannot be over emphasized—this makes it imperative
that the wives and children as well as the employees themselves are satisfied
with the location.
7. Corrupt local government, rackets, excessive city debt, and
instability of the city government all make a community an undesirable place
in which to locate a new plant.
8. '.Then an influential segment of the community is hostile toward
a new business there is good cause for a re-examination of that city to
be used as a plant site. Case studies shov; that influential leaders of
the community have a tremendous affect upon the prosperity of a company
.
Mm L. Greenhut, "Observations and Motive to Industry Locations."
Southern Economic Journal
,
Vol. No. 18, October, 1951. p. 225-228.
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Good-will with influential leaders can be a real advantage because many
sales are effected through buyers who are recommended to the firm by the
leaders of the community.
9, Outmoded city codes is another potential barrier to interregional
trade and nevj pacldng plant location. City laws that are not kept up-to-date
say cause a company needless expense fulfilling obsolete requirements.
It is not intended that the above-mentioned factors completely exhausts
the legal and institutional barriers to interregional trade and meat packing
plant location. Obviously the list of actual or possible barriers in this
area is almost infinite, however, the above-mentioned were the factors the
management personnel of meat packing companies deemed some of the most
important barriers in their industry.
FEDERAL FARM PROGRAMS
Passing mention should be given to the effects of the federal policies
concerning agriculture. As will be shown under Transportation Costs in
the Federal Barriers section, a primary factor in plant location of a meat
packing company is the proximity or nearness to the source of supply—there-
fore, meat packing plants tend to follow the shifts that lake place in
livestock production.
The point to be made in this section is that federal farm programs
tend to influence the shifts in the location of livestock. For example,
because of the past federal policy of limiting the number of acres that
farmers can plant of a certain crop, western Kansas has become an important
feeding center for livestock because instead of planting wheat, grain
sorghum was raised. An indication of the tendency for meat packers to
19
follow the source of supply—livestock—can be witnessed by the fact that
Kansas has increased substantially as an area for meat packers to locate.
See Table 2 and Changes in the Structure of the Meat Industry.
It therefore appears that the federal agricultural policy affects
changes in the individual farm programs which in turn effects changes in
industry.
GENERAL BARRIERS
General barriers to interregional trade and meat packing plant location
are those barriers that could not appropriately be classed under either
Federal barriers or State barriers. While the barriers mentioned in this
section may be applicable under the state and/or federal barriers section,
the general barriers cannot be primarily associated with either.
Meat Consumption
It is quite odd to note that the consumption of meat may be a general
barrier in itself to meat packing companies] The reason for this potential
locational barrier to pjieat packing companies lies in the fact that a packer
may build a new plant in an area in which the trend in meat consumption and/
or production has shown a long-run tendency to be on the decline
. For
example, a packer may build a plant specializing in the slaughter and
processing of a certain type of animal, such as pigs, and be unaware of the
fact that there is a long-run trend away from pork consumption in that
region—or even nationally—with a consistent long-run tendency toward
increased beef consumption. Or the packer may build a plant in an area
where livestock production has shown a long-run tendency to be declining,
such as the New England and Middle Atlantic regions discussed under the
Changes in the Structure in the Meat Industry Chapter, which would put that
20
packer at a potential economic disadvantage due to the increase in
transportation costs.
Because a shift in the concentration of population or the neat-eating
habits of people can have great economic consequences to the meat packer as
to his present and future plant location plans, as well as the type of
animals he vail slaughter and process, the meat packers will probably
want to avail himself of the most up-to-date information concerning the
income of the population, the per cent of that income spent on the purchase
of meat, and the present and forecast trends in meat consumption of the
future. Because expected trends in livestock production of the united
States was given in detail in the Changes in the Structure of the Meat
Industry chapter, this livestock production aspect will not be reiterated.
It will therefore be the purpose of this section to expose as many barriers
in this area as possible through a discussion of the present and expected
future trends in the consumption of meat.
The two major types of meat consumed in the United States are beef
and pork, which are competitive. That is, they compete with each other so
that a pound of beef bought means one pound less of pork that will be
purchased, and vice-versa. Only in the past seven years has beef consumption
surpassed that of pork. Lamb and mutton consumption was high during the
1930' s and V.orld War II but has declined to a fairly constant rate of four
pounds per capita over the past ten years, while per capita consumption of
veal slipped to 5.7 pounds in 1959, an all-time low.
Table 3 shows the use of meat per person for 6,000 households, in the
United States as a whole, and in the four geographical areas, during one
•'-Allen B. Richards and Peggy J. Biaggi, California and united States
L'eat Packing Industry, Division of Agricultural Sciences, university of
California, Circular 518, January, 1963, p. 10.
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Table 3. Use of Meat per Person, Farm and Non-farm Household, one Y,Teek
in Spring 1955, by Regions.
Lamb Lunch-
Region and All and Variety eon
Household Group Meat Beef Veal Mutton pork Meat Meats Lard
United States
Pounds
All 3.02 1.25 0.08 0.09 1.14 0.10 0.36
Urban 3.17 1.34 0.10 0.12 1.13 0.11 0.36 0.07
Rural non-farm 2.08 1.10 0.05 0.03 1.15 0.08 0.39 0.18
Farm 2.72 1.18 0.02 0.02 1.21 0.07 0.32 0.39
Northeast
All 3.07 1.29 0.12 0.19 0.98 0.13 0.37
Urban 3.10 1.29 0.15 0.23 0.95 0.14 0.35 0.02
Rural non-farm 2.92 1.23 0.06 0.09 1.01 0.10 0.43 0.07
Farm 3.30 1.54 0.05 0.07 1.15 0.09 0.39 0.18
North Central
All 3.37 1.51 0.07 0.05 1.23 0.09 0.42
Urban 3.42 1.52 0.10 0.08 1.22 0.09 0.42 0.04
Rural non-farm 3.17 1.43 0.05 0.01 1.17 0.08 0.43 0.11
Farm 3.45 1.61 0.02 0.01 1.34 0.06 0.40 0.27
South
All 2.57 0.85 0.04 0.02 1.26 0.09 0.30 —
_
Urban 2.93 1.09 0.06 0.03 1.33 0.12 0.30 0.16
Rural non-farm 2.32 0.64 0.03 0i02 1.22 0.06 0.34 0.32
Farm 2.18 0.68 0.01 0.01 1.18 0.06 0.23 0.56
West
All 3.31 1.62 0.07 0.13 1.00 0.11 0.37 ____
Urban 3.25 1.52 0.07 0.17 1.00 0.12 0.38 0.04
Rural non-farm 3.58 1.89 0.12 0.04 1.05 0.09 0.38 0.08
Farm 3.15 1.73 0.03 0.10 0.89 0.08 0.31 0.12
Source: Breimyer
,
Harold F. ,and Charlotte A. Kause, "Consumption patterns
for Heat, " in Household Food Consumption Survey, ',L955. Rpt. No. 5 t
Washington D. C, U. S. Govt. Print;ing Office, 1956, p. 11 •
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Graph 1. 1'eat Consumed per Capita, United States, 1910-1960.
Source: "Heat Consumption Trends and Patterns," U. S. Dept of Agriculture,
Agriculture Handbook No. 187, Washington, D. C, I960.
week in the spring of 1955. Graph 1 shows per capita consumption in the
United States as a whole from 1910 to I960.
The outlook for the meat industry is determined by the changed in
population and changes in per capita consumption of meat, as influenced
by consumer preference and income. Conservative estimates expect the
United States population to reach 220 million by 1975 and possibly 272.5
million or over by 1980.
Possible future trends in meat consumption are indicated by changes
within the total population. In the United States it is expected that the
number of consumers in the heavy meat-eating age group, those between 14
and 24, will increase in the coming years and at a greater rate of increase
itichards and Biaggi, op. cit
., p. 10.
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than that of other age groups. There are several factors that point to
the possibility that per capita meat consumption may not continue to increase
at the present rate. These factors are : (1) the bulk of the male labor
force (ages 24 to 44) will remain fairly constant; (2) the number of working
women is increasing; (3) fewer people over 65 will be in the labor force;
(4) younger persons will have a longer period of education; and (5) part-
time employment will increase. All of these factors have an adverse effect
upon consumption. However, after 1965 the population composition and the
characteristics of the labor force suggest a marked increase in consumption
of meat of all kinds. It has been predicted that per capita consumption
of all meat may reach 175 pounds by 1975, compared with the present 165
pounds.
Present trends indicate that mere types and varieties of meat will
be demanded but beef is expected to continue to be consumed at a higher
rate than all other types. It is also expected that beef consumption
will rise proportionately more than that of other meats as income increases.
Not only vail the deaand for beef continue to increase relatively
more than the demand for pork, lamb, or veal, but present consumption
trends indicate an increased demand for convenience meats
—
precut, frozen,
precooked, prepared meats, variety and luncheon meats, as well as canned
products. However, it appears unlikely that the demand for convenience
meats will increase more rapidly than the demand for other types of meats.
While personal disposable income has increased in the united States,
the percentage of that income spent for meat has declined from 5.5 in 1950
to 4.8 in 1959. Despite the fact that from 1950 to 1959, the demand for
T&chards and Biaggi, op_. cit.
, p. 10.
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pork has slipped by 25 per cent, the percentage of income spent on beef
has increased (See Table 4)
.
The relative growth rates and increases in income are very important
in determining future consumption patterns.
The effect of income changes on the quantity of meat consumed
can be measured by the income elasticity of demand. This is the
per cent of increase in quantity of neat consumed that results
from a one per cent increase in real income—income after price
changes are taken into account. Recent estimates indicate that
a one per cent increase in real income results in a percentage
increase in consumption of all meat of 0.35 J of beef, 0.4; of
pork, 0.25; of lamb, 0.06. As real income rises, consumers tend
to buy better quality meats, rather than larger quantities.
This indicates that cattle producers vd.ll tend to gain by providing top
quality products to meet the rising consumer demand.
Heat prices were at their low in 1956, when per capita consumption was
at a record high. Lower relative prices since then, however, have not induced
consumers to eat more meat. In fact, per capita consumption since 1956 has
been well below the 167 pounds recorded for that year.
It is likely that, as livestock numbers grow, they will have
a dampening effect on meat prices. Also, red meats will be subject
to continued price competition from other food products, particularly
poultry, eggs, and dairy products. Price elasticities of demand show
the influence of prices on meat consumption by. indicating the changes
in consumption associated with a one per cent change in retail price.
Estimates for all meats range from -0.82 to-0.24. This means that
a one per cent change in the price of all meats is associated with
a 0.24 to 0.32 per cent change in the opposite direction in quantity
of meat consumed. For beef, estimates of price elasticities have
an even wider range from -0.75 to -0.96. Therefore, other things
being equal, lower relative prices will result in a less than propor-
tionate increase in meat consumption.
Again it would appear that it would be to the meat packers advantage
to constantly familiarize himself with the most recent information concerning
the trends in meat consumption so that these shifts do not become economic
barriers
.
•^-Richards and Biaggi, op_. cit., p. 10
25
Table 4. Retail Value of Meat Consumed, As a Percentage of Disposable
Personal Income, 1935-39 Average and 1946-59*
Year Total Heat Beef pork
Per Cent
1935-39 Average 5.7 2.2 2.8
1946 . 4.6 1.6 2.4
1947 6.3 2.6 3.1
1943 6.1 2.6 2.8
1949 5.6 2.5 2.6
1950 5.5 2.5 2.4
1951 5.5 , 2.5 2.5
1952 5.4 2.5 2.4
1953 5.1 2.3 2.2
1954 5.0 2.3 2.2
1955 4.7 2.3 2.0
1956 4.5 2.2 1.8
1957 4.6 2.4 1.8
1958 5.0 2.6 1.9
1959 4.8 2.6 1.8
"""Retail value is computed by multiplying by retail prices the fresh
retail-cost equivalents of beef, veal, lamb and mutton, and pork con-
sumed. Includes home produced meat as well as all meat sold.
Beef, veal, lamb and mutton, and pork.
Preliminary
Source: The National Food Situation, NFS-93, Washington, D. C, U3DA,
July, I960
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City ordinances
A barrier to interregional trade and meat packing plant location
that virtually defies analysis exists in the area of city ordinances.
Early probing in this area disclosed that perhaps the greatest barriers
to meat packers lies in this field but because the laws, regulations,
requirements and restrictions placed upon meat packers and their products
v.'ere as many and varied as the number of cities themselves it was beyond
this writer's capacity to investigate the various city ordinances to its
fullest extent. About all that can be said about this subject is that
each city has some ordinances that will govern his plants and products.
Some of the "typically varied" city ordinances can be found in the
following: (1) almost all cities have zoning laws governing the building
of structures to be used in differing capacities. Meat packing plants are
usually—but not always—banned to the outskirts of the community to
avoid obnoxious odors, noise, flies, etc.j (2) a circumstance that was
as effective as a city ordinance developed in a city in Texas when a local
meat packer was "prevented" from obtaining state meat inspection in lieu
of city inspection because the city inspection "froze" at the suggestion
of state meat inspectionj (3) some cities do not recognize the inspection
seal of other political units. Yvhen a city does not permit reciprocity
of inspection and demands the product be further inspected by city officials
before the product can be sold in that city, it has the effect of a local
tariff on the incoming product which tends to raise the cost of that product
and gives a meat packer already located in that city a cost advantage.
For these reasons and other reasons similar in nature to this,
"
T?he National Provisioner
,
Ttfhat's the State of State Meat Inspection,
p. 8.
'
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innumerable barriers—both legal and institutional—may confront a meat
packer in a potential location that he may be totally unaware of unless
a thorough search is made.
Labor Unions
The subject of labor and labor unions is a critical area that deserves
much consideration when contemplating a site for a new plant of any type.
Because of the economic impact of labor upon a plant's operation and profit,
this area is being thoroughly explored at Michigan State University, a
co-partner in the entire research project. Because of this fact, this
writer has not done extensive research in this area and it is suggested
i
that the interested reader write the Economics Department at Michigan
State University for a copy of the analysis concerning labor and labor
unions.
The limited amount of research in this area disclosed that labor
unions are fairly active and effective in gaining concessions from the
companies for whom they are employed. Apparently there are three major
"meat" unions: (1) the United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers,
(2) the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America,
both AFL-CIO affiliated, and (3) the National Brotherhood of packinghouse
Vforkers, an independent union.
.
Further, according to private letters from
meat packing companies in response to a questionnaire, the employees range
from unskilled to very skilled, with the greatest portion being in the
semi-skilled to skilled class.
It has been found that there is a cost advantage in locating a plant
where there is no labor union because labor unions are able to gain higher
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wages for their members than their counterparts who are not so represented.
This survey conducted by the United States Depariment of Labor revealed
that the average expenditures were relatively higher for the class of
establishments in which a majority of the employees were under collective
bargaining agreements as compared to establishments in which a majority
of the employees were not unionized.
1
On the basis of this survey, then,
it appears probable that small meat packers have an advantage because they
are too "small" to be unioned and that meat packers located in the
southern portions of the United States have a cost advantage because of the
general absence of labor unions in that area. It is therefore probable
that non-unionized meat packers will be able to avail themselves of lower
labor costs.
These probabilities have been partially substantiated by one packer who
stated that some of his company's branches in the South, as well as other
national packers with branches in southern states, have ceased operation that
was due in part to the wage differential that existed between their non-
unionized plants in the south and their competitors in the same area who
were non-unionized.
If these probabilities are subseojaently borne out by the Michigan State
University analysis the barrier to meat packing plant location would be
derived from locating in an area where the likelihood of the plant being
unionized is high. Therefore, other things being equal, it would be economi-
cally advantageous for a meat packer to locate his plant in the areas where
the company would not be under union control, thereby avoiding comparatively
Employer Expenditure for Selected Supplementary Remuneration practices
for production y/orkers in Manufacturing Industries, 1939 . Bulletin No. ljjGij,
1962. p. 9l^
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higher wage costs, which in turn would give him a cost advantage in selling
his products.
FEDERAL BARRIERS
Federal barriers to interregional trade and meat packing plant
location are, on the whole, general in nature. That is, they generally
affect the whole meat industry in the same way but in such a manner as to
put the meat industry at a relative disadvantage with other industries.
For example, a very strict, detailed and relatively costly meat inspection
regulation may cause a general increase in meat products so as to give the
poultry, fish, seafoods, etc. industries a relative cost advantage. It
will be the purpose of this section, then, to. expose the barriers facing
the meat industry imposed by the federal government.
Federal Inspection
Packers who sell meat in inter-state or foreign commerce are required
to meet certain federal inspection requirements. All equipment and
material that will or may be in contact with edible products must have
Heat Inspection Division approval. The material must be cleared for
toxicity, physical usefulness and durability. Toxicity could pose a
danger even in ceiling and wall materials because of the possibility
that water might drip from the surface and contaminate the product.
For this reason a person about to purchase a building formerly used as
a packinghouse would probably want to ascertain whether or not the
building was cleared by the MED because the products produced in that
plant may have been sold in intra-state commerce only.
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The cost of constructing and equipping a plant to meet these speci-
fications is greater than would otherwise be the case, in order to get
Meat Inspection Division approval very exacting requirements must be met —
requirements that tend to discourage the construction of new plants and
encourage the continued use of older plants that have met the MID require-
ments. Thus, the erection of a new plant may be hindered in what might be
a more economic location.
It should be recalled, however, that federal inspection regulations
are uniform throughout the United States and that this in itself is no
more of a barrier in one state than another. In so far as it is a barrier
it supresses uniformly.
As vail be discussed later under State Inspection Costs, a great deal
of variation exists from state to state thereby causing inspection costs
to be greater in one state than another.
A further small barrier is encountered by meat packing companies in
the area of federal inspection costs. The government pays the salaries
of inspectors for services performed during regular hours. However, the
packer is required to re-imburse the government for the cost of overtime
inspection. This, therefore, presents an added cost to these packers who
have a larger volume of business than their plant can handle during regular
hours.
Transportation Costs
In the initial stages of the research of legal and institutional
barriers to interregional trade and meat packing plant location it seemed
*U.S « Inspected Heat packing Plants ; A Guide to Construction
,
Equipment and Layout
,
Agriculture Handbook No. 191, Agriculture Research
Service, U3DA, January, 1961.
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probable that a primary consideration in locating a meat
packing plant
might be due to a large consuming immediate market and/or a
single large
consumer of meat such as a large federal or state institution
that purchased
hugh quantities of meat products because that packer
presumably would have
a selling advantage due to loner transportation costs to
the point of
destination. However, further investigation into this area
revealed that
the packer may or may not have a selling advantage because it is
considerably
cheaper to ship the carcass than the live weight . One major packer
estimated that he saved 75£ to 80£ cwt by shipping carcass rather than
liveweight, which is coupled with the fact that there are fewer problems
concerning bruising of the animals in transient. Despite the fact that
insurance will cover this loss, there are still the correspondingly higher
insurance costs.
It has also been found that there is a tissue shrink to contend with
during transport which can amount to as much as $12 per head. Some packers
claim that this is no deterrent because they generally keep the animals
for a day or two before slaughter. However, this misses the point because
there is an additional cost of feed required to replace the shrinkage,
not to mention the additional facilities and labor necessary to keep the
animals until they are slaughtered. Compared to the 2% to h% shrink for
live animals during shipment there is only an approximate »% shrink
for carcass shipment.
Because of the aforementioned reasons, it is more profitable to
locate a packing plant as close as possible to the source of supply rather
•^Bruce p. Lord, The Potential for Meat Packing in Northeastern Oregon,
Research Report No. 44, October, 19ol. p. 22.
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than in the area of consumption. However, if a packer can locate in the
proximity of both the source of supply and consumption—especially if it
is also near a large prison or military reservation that consumes large
quantities of meat—the packer would definitely have a locational advantage.
There are other aspects to the location of a meat packing company
that fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government. All interstate
transportation facilities are regulated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission—and commensurate with the ICC are myriads of rates from the
point of origin to destination and different rates that apply to different
types of commodities. For example, the rate from Denver to Topeka for a
ton of coal is different than for a ton of furniture, or a ton of meat, etc.
Moreover, the rate to haul the same goods back from Topeka to Denver may be
different.
The point of the discussion is this: Some interstate rates for hauling
products may be favorable while other rates may not be favorable to the
shipper. Therefore, it would be an advantage, other things being equal,
for a meat packer to locate in a community in which the freight rates to
other points of destination are favorable. Moreover, there are many
communities in the United States that do not have existing rates for
certain types of commodities, such as meat, when that community is used
as a point of origin. Therefore, a meat packer may be able to obtain
favorable rates, perhaps through political pressure, for his meat products,
thereby gaining a cost advantage.
Vertical Integration
"
In the meat-packing industry, integration generally means the linking
of different stages of production and marketing between two or more firms
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through contract or other form of agreement, rather than having units
in the various production levels under the control of one organization.
VJhile most integration results from two or more firms contracting
to control various stages of production there have been several noteable
exceptions in which vertical integration has been attempted by a single
meat paclang company. Full vertical integration may be defined as the
control of a product from the source of supply to the sale of the finished
product; whereas partial vertical integration is the control of more than
one process or step in converting raw material at the source of supply
to the sale of the finished product. Through a consent decree issued
by a United States Federal court in 1920, four major meat padding companies
were barred from engaging in expanding their partial vertical integration
attempts. A brief summary of this legal barrier to meat packing companies
is in order.
The Y/ilson Packing Company, Swift & Company, Armour and Company and
The Cudahy Packing Company were all forbidden to: (1) deal in more than
140 non-meat items in 14 specified classes, including fish, vegetables,
fruits, spice3 and grain j (2) use their distributive facilities for
handling those itemsj (3) engage in retail trade, and (4) deal in fresh
milk or cream.
Three of the packers, Swift, Armour and Cudahy, sought relief from
the consent decree in 1932 to which U. S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin
Cardoso stated that unless the petitioners presented a clear showing of
hardship, hardship "so extreme and unexpected as to justify us in saying
that they are the victims of oppression" and "grievous wrong evoked by
now and unforeseen conditions,"1 the packers would not receive relief
hhe National provisioner, Dec. 17, I960, p. 17
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from the consent decree. Judge Julius J. Hoffman, who decided the most
recent plea for relief by the packers in I960, stated that
The petitioners remain, to the extent that they were in
1930 the dominating forces in the meat industry. In combined
totals, they own assets in excess of $1,000,000,000, over half
the value of the assets of the entire meat industry. They account
for nearly half the nation's meat sales. They slaughter nearly 40
per cent of the commercially slaughtered livestock in the nation.
On the question of hardship, Judge Hoffman said, it is not
enough that the petitioners' profits have been modest, or that
other concerns in the food industry have enjoyed greater returns
and more rapid growth. To the extent that the petitioner's
hardship is only the denial of the opportunity to diversify into
more rewarding branches of the food industry, the burden is not
new or unforeseen, but was specifically contemplated in the framing
of the decree.1
Apparently the main contention of the meat packers was the economic
conditions had changed enough to warrant a waiver of the consent decree.
The legal barrier to interregional trade foisted upon the meat packers
in this area is that other industries are not subjected to the consent
decree and therefore have an important economic advantage over the meat
packers because they can enjoy the economies of scale of vertical integration
to its fullest extent that is profitable to them. Specifically, the
dominating position of the retail chain stores have caused the meat packers
the greatest concern. This position is steadily increasing and
the chain stores have gained an almost unassailable bargaining
position, as exemplified by the tremendous growth of private
label merchandise. Chain stores, canners, frozen food processors
and others freely enter the meat packing field but the decree
blocks the four packers from competing fully with such processors
and bars them from entering the retail field.1
It has been only recently that the federal government has sought
to remove this legal barrier confronting meat packing companies; to place
•^The National Provisioner, June 22, 1957. p. 29.
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all of the industries competing in the meat field on an equal footing.
Because it was obviously discriminatory to restrict one industry in
their vertical integration efforts and allow another industry to go un-
checked, the wheels of government are slowly beginning to turn. A bill to
bar meat packers from retailing and retailers from packing—and to exclude
both groups from the livestock feeding business-if their gross sales exceeded
$30,000,000 in the preceding calendar year, has been introduced in the
Senate as 3-1270 by Senator C-eorge McGovern (D-S.D.). The proposed
amendment to the Packers and Stockyards Act is similar to a pending House
Bill (HH-1706) sponsored by Rep. James Roosevelt (D-Cal.), but the
Roosevelt bill proposed that the meat packers and livestock feeders
would be able to compete in each other's field—to be treated as one
class—while the retailers would be prohibited from entering this area,
and would be considered a class by themselves. Senator McGovern stated
when introducing his measure:
I have been concerned for several years about the growing '
concentration of power and monopolistic practices in livestock,
meat and poultry marketing. This problam has been made more acute
by the recent sharp decline in cattle and beef prices. Throughout
the meat and poultry industry the vertical integration of retailing
With wholesaling, transportation, manufacturing, processing and
production including livestock feeding has added to the concentration
of economic power. In addition, the acquisition by large corporate
food chains of competing retailers and manufacturing and processing
plants is a further threat to independent business..
. .This bill,
I am convinced, would be a great help to livestock feeders and
poultry growers in preventing the use of feedlots and packinghouse
to depress prices. *•
The penalty proposed by both bills is a fine up to $50,000 and/or
imprisonment for up to one year.
hhe national Provisioner. April 13, 1963 . p. 17.
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Nevertheless, the legal barrier prohibiting further vertical inte-
gration to meat packers still exists because neither of the proposed
amendments to the Packers and Stockyards Act have been passed. Senator
McGovern's proposed bill for the removal of dominating and unassailable
position of the other industries presently entering and competing with
meat packers and placing them at an economic disadvantage may be the answer
to the packer's plea for relief for the removal of this legal barrier to
interregional trade confronting them.
Price Discrimination
price discrimination may be deemed to be a barrier to meat packing
plant location and interregional trade because of its tendency to
eliminate competition in the long-run. While all of the companies
interviewed in the survey (see Procedure and Sources of information Section)
felt that price discrimination in the meat industry was definitely lacking^
there nevertheless have been cases involving this type of practice.
According to Glenn G. Bierman, head of the packer section, packers
and Stockyards Branch, Livestock Division, United States Department of
Agriculture, the discriminatory trade practices of the types prescribed
by the Robinson-Patman Act, which is enforced by the Federal Trade commission,
also would be illegal under the terms of Title II of the packers and
Stockyards Act.
The five types of illegal practices listed by Mr. Bierman are :
1. To discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of the discrimination, or with
customers of either of them.
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2. To be a party to, or assist in, any transaction or sale or
contract to sell which discriminates to the packer's knowledge
against competitors of the purchaser in- that any discount, rebate,
allowance or advertising service charge, whether based on volume or
tonnage or otherwise, is granted to the purchaser over and above
any discount, rebate, allowance transaction to said competitors
in respect of sale of goods of like grade, quality and quantity.
3. To pay, or offer to pay, to managers or other employees
of a purchaser, premiums or money payments as an inducament to such
employees to 'push' the sal© of the packer's products rather than
the sale of its competitors' products at retail in the purchaser's
store or stores.
4. To make payments to a purchaser for providing shelf space
in its store or stores to display the packer's products, and not to
make equal payments to other customers who provide equivalent display
space for the packer's products in their stores.
5. VJhere both the seller and the purchaser are 'packers'
subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act and the purchaser induces
the seller to grant to it, or accepts or permits its employees to
accept from its seller, any such discounts, rebates, allowance, or
payments as above-described, the said purchaser having knowledge
of the discriminatory nature thereof .-'-
At the present time the United States Department of Agriculture has
the problem of enforcing these laws. Some people claim that the USDA
does not have the "teeth" or facilities to investigate and insure the
compliance of laws of the industries under its jurisdiction. It has been
further claimed that the Federal Trade Commission is a "natural" to take
over the investigation and enforcement duties of the USDA because the
Federal Trade Commission has the facilities for this type of work, whereas
the USDA does not.
The shifting of the enforcement responsibilities from the USDA to
the Federal Trade Commission is not a popular idea among the meat packers.
Every responding meat packer declared that in his opinion the USDA could do
^The National provisioner
, November 28, 1959. p. 20.
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an adequate job of enforcement, as indicated by the past record. Moreover,
the meat packers claim, the USDA knows the problems of the meat industry and
has competent specialists to deal with those problems whereas the Federal
Trade Commission does not have the background in this area.
The barrier in this area is the proposed inability of the USDA to
adequately police the industry. Despite the fact that the responding meat
packers were in favor of the USDA continuing to enforce price discrimination
regulations, many people-*- still claim that at the present time and with the
present facilities the USDA cannot comprehensively investigate the meat
industry as to its price practices. There is always the possibility
that the motivation behind the packer's decision for continuing USDA
enforcement is. for this very reason.
Some information pointing to this conclusion is evidenced in the
November 28, 1959, issue of The National provisioner which stated, in effect,
that industries completely outside the meat packing industry may buy a
portion of a meat packing company in order to fall under the jurisdiction
of the USDA. It appears, then, that the "business world" feels that the
Federal Trade Commission, under whose jurisdiction the area of price dis-
crimination would ordinarily fall, is a much more effective agency in
investigating and enforcing strict compliance of price discrimination
regulations that is the USDA.
Vfoile it is true that the USDA has uncovered some cases of price
discrimination the point still remains that there is at least some question
as to its effectiveness in policing this area of the industry. And if
price discrimination is not adequately enforced a great barrier to trade
^The National Provisioner, Hay k, 1957. p. 43.
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nay confront the smaller meat packers because they could not compete
with the unfair competition of the larger suppliers of meat, it would,
therefore, be of special benefit to the smaller meat packers if this
barrier to trade were eliminated through strict enforcement of the price
discrimination laws. And as stated above, there is some question as to
the USDA's ability to perform this demanding tasks for which it is not
primarily geared.
Sewage Disposal
A very important factor to be considered when contemplating a location
of a new packing plant is that of sewage disposal. The possibility of a
tremendous cost advantage may be realized by locating near a river or stream
that is large enough to dispose of effluent from a meat packing plant. In
response to a question concerning the method of disposing of plant
effluent one packer stated that the estimated cost was about 14<£ per
1,000 pounds live weight kill, which covers maintenance, operation and
amortization of investment. Another packer stated that, although he did
not wish to disclose the actual costs in this area, the costs were substan-
tial.
However, it is possible that the advantage of locating near a river
may actually turn into a disadvantage.
In the third such order issued, Kansas City, Kansas, Kansas City,
Missouri, and a long list of industrial firms have been ordered to
stop discharging untreated wastes into the Missouri .River or its
tributaries by January 1, 1963, Arthur Flemming, Sec. of HEW announced
last week. Similar orders were issued some time ago against St. Joseph,
Mo., Sious City, la., and a number of meat processors and other firms
in those cities. Among industrial establishments named in the latest
order are Kansas City Stockyards Co., Kansas City, Mo., and Swift &
Co., Kansas City, Kansas. Cost of the necessary muncipal sewage
treatment facilities for the Kansas City area was estimated at
$32, 500, 000.x
^The National Provisioner, July 9, I960, p.15.
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If the firms in the Kansas City area are forced to pay all or a
large portion of the expense of constructing a sewage plant it would
become a definite locational disadvantage for the firms already estab-
lished in that area and it would present itself as a locational barrier
to a firm contemplating that area as a plant site.
One meat packer interviewed went so far as to state;
We have come to believe that the best thing for our company to
do in establishing a slaughtering facility is to handle all arrange-
ments for plant effluent entirely independently of any other existing
facilities, municipal or otherwise. -*•
The possibility of discharging the wastes into a municipal
sewage system for treatment at the municipal sewage treatment plant
should be thoroughly investigated before embarking upon the design of
separate waste treatment facilities, it is important that meat plant
officials discuss and reach agreements with both State water polution
control authorities and appropriate municipal sewage treatment officials
before making the final decision as to treatment and disposal of wastes.
One factor to be considered in treatment of packinghouse wastes
in conjunction with domestic sewage is the proper evaluation of charges
for treatment.2
In its present form, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act does
not forbid the discharge of untreated effluent from plants nor does it
authorize the establishment by the Federal Government of any standards
for waste discharges or receiving waters. Enforcement actions are under-
taken when an appropriate request under section 8 of the Act; or when
the Secretary of HEW has reason to believe on the basis of reports, surveys
and studies that polution is occurring in one State which is endangering
Stated in a private letter in response to a Questionnaire by Br.
I. J. Holton, Secretary, of the Geo. A. Hormel & Co"., Austin, Minnesota,
June 10, 1963.
2An Industrial Waste Guide to the Meat Industry, published by the
U. S. Department or Health, Education, and Welfare,"I958.
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the health or welfare of persons in another State. To date their have
been twenty such enforcement actions, including four on the Missouri
River.
Therefore, a barrier to meat packing plant location presents itself
in those areas where a new sewage disposal plant needs to be built to
accommodate the increased amount of effluent due to a federal order to
"cease and desist" dumping effluent into a river—when industry is forced to
pay a disproportionate share, or an excessive amount—and when industry is
forced to pay a disproportionate amount to use the existing municipal
sewage system to dispose of its effluent. However, a locational advantage
develops when a packer may dump his untreated effluent into a nearby stream
without endangering the health and welfare of people farther down-stream.
The possibility also exists that an inexpensive method of pre-treating
effluent before disposing of it in a nearby river would be a locational
advantage
.
It appears, then, that it would be to a meat packer's advantage to
fully investigate all of the sewage disposal possibilities in order to
eliminate or reduce as much as possible this potential locational barrier
to meat packing plant location.
STATE BARKERS
An indicated earlier under Federal Barriers, the barriers to
interregional trade and meat packing plant location do not stem, primarily,
•'-Stated in a private letter from Mr. Murray Stein, Enforcement ' Branch
Chief, Division of Water Supply and Pollution Control, May 14, 1963.
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from the state requirements but cone principally from the differences in
the state requirements. For example, if one state requires that the meat
packers pay all of the cost of meat inspection it vail impose an additional
economic burden compared to the packers located in a sister-state that
has state-financed meat inspection because relative to the meat that
was federally inspected—which is free of charge to the packers—the meat
products of packer-financed inspection will tend to be higher.
Bond Requirements
There appears to be an increasing need for the requirement of bonds
by meat packers to insure payment to producers. This barrier to meat
packing companies presents itself in the form of the various state require-
ments for bonds to be purchased by meat packers. 7Jhile the need for a
uniform bonding requirement is great, the state-by-state approach is not
the answer to protect livestock sellers because it is more costly and less
effective than a federal law dealing in this area. Despite the fact that
bills providing for packer bonding have been introduced in Congress at
various times, no action has been taken to date.
The need for bonding requirements lies in the fact that buying customs
have changed. Thirty years ago nearly all of the livestock was sold through
public terminal stockyard purchases and the sellers were protected by the
bonds carried by the market agency through which the livestock was sold.
But at the present time an increasing proportion of the livestock bought
has been sold directly to packers or dealers or through auction markets.
It has been estimated that the amount of losses sustained in a number of
instances in recent years by livestock sellers from the failure of a single
packer has been in excess of $130,000J This is less than the cost of the
43
bonds needed to insure payment to livestock sellers for the entire meat
packing industry!
But because only nine states have bonding requirements, it has the
effect of a local tax upon meat packing companies. The following are the
states that have bonding requirements as of May, 1961; Colorado, $1,000;
North Dakota, 35,000 bond from each packer with an additional $1,500 for
each agent representing the packer; Georgia, bonds are based on the value
of livestock purchased by packers. These bonds range from $2,000 to $50,000;
Florida requires bonds of packers in the amounts of $5,000 and $10,000 of
resident packers; Mississippi requires $10,000 bonds of resident packers;
Washington requires $3,000 bonds; Ohio requires bonds of resident packers;
2
Indiana requires bonds of resident packers; Nevada requires $5,000 bonds.
Because of the "local tax" imposed upon meat packers in these nine
states, other things being equal, the packers locating in those states would
have a cost disadvantage equal to the cost of the bonds they were required
to purchase. This "local tax," is a legal barrier to meat packing plant
location that could be eliminated through federal action.
Inspection Costs
One of the major barriers to meat packing plant location rests with
the variation of the method of payment of inspection costs among states.
For this reason the meat packers of the states that do not have fully state
financed programs of meat inspection are under an economic handicap. The
conscientious packer not engaged in interstate commerce will want his product
inspected to protect his customers—this forces him to pay for the inspection.
•hrhe National Provisioner
, May 6, 1961. p. 21-22.
2
As stated in a private letter by Gerald Engelman, packers and stockyards
Division, February 13, 1963.
kk
The inspection cost must either come from the packers t profits or else td.ll
necessitate a rise in his prices—both put the meat packer at a disadvantage
relative to other firms whose inspection costs may be paid by the state or
federal government.
Because the federal government pays the cost of inspection for packers
that ship in inter-state commerce it puts a premium on size. Case studies
have indicated that U5DA grade and/or USDA inspection were considered
by most people to be the most important factor that influenced the purchase
of beef. On the basis of this study it appears that smaller packers (those
dealing in intra-state commerce only) have an inherent disadvantage because
discriminating consumers prefer federally inspected meat to state inspected
meat. Moreover, it has been contended2 that the state inspected plants
cannot afford to pay salaries for meat inspectors equal to those offered
by competing agencies. Nor do these inspectors receive the benefits
of retirement, sick and vacation leave, etc. Consequently, it is becoming
increasingly more difficult to secure qualified inspectors for the job.
It has also been contended2 that the non-federally inspected packers
who must finance part or all of the cost of inspection are at a further
disadvantage because they cannot compete with an ever-increasing number of
licensed custom farm slaughterers who have relatively small investments in
equipment and facilities and do not have meat inspection and plant
maintenance to bear.
There is one more aspect to this meat inspection question that must be
•'•Betty L. 7<
Toods and Martha C. Jenkins, Motivations in Consumer purchases
of Beef
,
Bulletin No. 565, Louisiana State and Agricultural and Mechanical
College, Agricultural Experiment Station, April, 1963. p. 9»
^The National Provisioner, July 21, 1962. p. 28.
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considered. The states that have a voluntary meat inspection program, as
well as those states that have no provisions for a meat inspection program
at all, put the consuming public at the mercy of the packers. Meat packers
are human beings. And as human beings they want to make as large a profit
as they can. It has been found that unscrupulous packers have used diseased
or already dead animals for processing. Moreover, there is nothing to pre-
vent them from using portions of the carcass such as eyes, lungs, entrails,
etc. as "filler" for their processed meats.
United States Department of Agriculture representatives conducted a
survey recently that included a cross section of the non-federaHy inspected
meat packers in the country. The observations covered slaughtering and
meat processing plants that varied in size of operation from small establish-
ments employing one or two persons to large plants employing several. The
USDA representatives visited these plants in every state except Alaska. The
observations revealed that conditions and practices in many plants were
wholly unacceptable under federal inspection standards.
Some of the worst conditions observed by the USDA representatives
included:
1. Allowing edible portions of carcasses to come in contact
with manure, pus, and other sources of contamination during the
dressing operations.
2. Allowing meat food products during preparation to become
contaminated with filth from improperly cleaned equipment and
facilities.
3. Use of chemical additives and preservatives that would not
be permitted under federal inspection.
4. Failing to use procedures to detect or control parasites
transmissible to man that would lead to diseases, such as trichinosis
and cysticercosis.
•^he National Provisioner, "USDA Reports on State Inspection study."
April JJ, 1% 'j. p. 20. ^'
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5. Use of inspection and operating controls that were not
sufficient to prevent possible adulteration of meat food products
during their preparation with substances such as water, gum, cereals
or sodium caseinate.
6. The use of false or deceptive labels and packaging.
7. Failing to supervise destruction of obviously diseased tissues
and spoiled, putrid or filthy materials.
8. Working without any inspector or with unqualified inspectors,
without adequate supervision.!
Obviously the need is great for a change from status quo in several
states. While many plants visited by the representatives of the USDA
were above reproach in every respect many of the plants need further
improvements to protect the consuming public by meeting the minimum
requirements established by the federal government. The comparison below
reveals the major differences between federal law and the various laws of
the 50 states concerning meat inspection.
1FEDSE/a
1. Preslaughter inspection
of every animal.
2. Examination of all carcasses
and vicera.
STATE
1. 17 states have ante mortem
inspection
2. 18 states have similar
provisions.
3 . Supervision of sanitation of 3 . 25 states have varying
plant and equipment at all times.
4. Mark of inspection on meat
products
.
sanitary requirements.
4. 27 states require marking
inspected products.
5. Reinspection of meats that 5« 6 states provide for
may have deteriorated during handling, reinspection.
6. Examiration of all meat dur- 6. 16 states have somewhat
ing processing.
, similar provisions.
7. Prohibition of false or
deceptive labels.
8. Criminal penalties for
violations
.
7. 16 states have somewhat
similar provisions.
8. 28 states provide some
penalties.
The National Provisioner, loc. cit.
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FEDERAL (Cent.) STATE (Coot.)
9. Authority to withdraw or 9. 27 states—in varying
deny inspection for noncompliance. degrees.
10. Under supervision unfit meats 10. 21 states include some pro-
and meat products condemned and vision for control of condemned
destroyed for food purposes. meats.
.
11. Inspection financed by 11. 9 states appropriate funds
appropriated fundi, except for over- fear entire cost of inspection}
time. Industry reimburses USDA for 8 states require industry to pay
overtime. entire costj 17 states share cost
with industry.
Not only does a barrier arise out of the variation of the inspection
costs due to the fact that, other things being equal, a federally inspected
plant does not have to pay inspection costs v/hereas the packer dealing solely
in intra-state commerce in most states does, but that the knowledge of the
unhealthy conditions existing in some. meat plants by the consuming public
may cause an unorganized partial boycott of meat products. Even if the
abstinence from meat buying occurrs only to a limited degree a barrier is
nevertheless presented because of the adverse economic consequences on the
meat industry due to a lower volume of meat being sold than would otherwise
be the case if all states had a meat inspection program comparable to the
USDA's. From the case study referred to earlier^ people have confidence
in federally inspected meat—and it would be advantageous for intra-state
packers if an equal amount of confidence was shared with the state meat
inspection programs.
Other problems are involved in the determination of which agency should
be given the authority to administer the state meat inspection program.
In at least three states that now have no meat inspection programs
—
Ohio,
woods and Jenkins, loc . cit
.
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Michigan and Wisconsin—the health and agricultural agencies have sponsored
separate bills in the past with health officials urging packer-paid voluntary
programs under their jurisdictions while agriculture officials were seeking
a state-financed mandatory inspection. The inter-agency conflict over
regulatory authority clouded the arguments for meat inspection in these
states, and the public health issue of the necessity of the inspection got
lost.
The meat packers apparently prefer the state agricultural agency be
given the jurisdiction of meat inspection—as it is on the federal level.
This will allow the same agency to detect the diseases at the slaughter house
and trace the animals back to the point of origin for more effective disease
control. A further advantage lies in the fact that state agricultural
officials to keep them up-to-date with the latest developments at the
federal level.
Additional barriers to meat packing plant location and interregional
trade arise through the various laws and regulations of the states regarding
the use of artificial coloring, tax inducements, grading, and policies deal-
ing vdth trade promotions—trading stamps, coupons, etc. See Table 5.
The use of artificial coloring and additives on meat products permitted
by states runs the gamut from no laws dealing in this area to absolute
prohibition; but most of the states indicated that their regulation in
this area were similar to, or the same as, USDA regulations. The barriers
with regard to this subject lies in the fact that a plant producing in a
state where no artificial coloring of meat can be used will tend to have
a disadvantage selling in a state that allows artificial coloring, or has
•Woods and Jenkins, op. cit. p. 5.
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no restriction in this area, because the artificially colored meat will
appear better, or more presentable, than will the non-artificially colored
meat. This, in turn, tends to cause consumers to choose the artificially
colored meat because it "looks" better than the non-colored meat. This
gives the local packer a selling advantage not enjoyed by the packer producing
in a state where artificial coloring is prohibited.
It is probable that, other things being equal, a packer will choose to
locate in the state that allows the artificial coloring of meat products
because he can sell his product in his home state and other states that
permit artificial coloring and he can also sell in the states that do not
allo\v artificial coloring by eliminating the coloring and additives—and
be as an effective competitor as the packers producing in the non-coloring
state. But because artificial coloring and additives are not allowed in
some states—even though the meat is destined for out-of-state consumption
—
the packer producing in the state that restricts artificial coloring is at
a selling disadvantage.
Virtually the same reasoning holds true for state regulations controlling
meat shrinkage tolerances. Because some states have laws that are more strict
than others concerning meat shrinkage allowances, the packer producing in the
state that has less stringent tolerances—or no laws in this area at all
—
will have a cost advantage because he will not have to use full measure
"plus a little more" to insure that he has met the reojiirements of the state,
as is true of packers producing in states with strict tolerances, nor will
his operating cost be as high because less time of his employees will be spent
weighing his product, not to mention that both time and money will be saved
when a processed meat product is slightly underweight because it will not
woods and Jenkins, op. cit. p. 5.
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have to be re-opened and re-packed.
For all of the above-mentioned reasons, then, the packer located in the
state that allows no tolerance will have a cost disadvantage. Therefore,
other things being equal, a packer would tend to locate in that state with
lax weight tolerances to take advantage of lower costs of operation.
In regard to tax inducements and regulations affecting trade promotions,
the same basic reasoning holds true. Other things being equal, a meat packer
will tend to locate in that state that gives the greatest incentive, be
it a waiver on taxes for a period of years, free plant site, etc. He
will also tend to give consideration to those states that have legislation
favorable to a meat packer that deal in the area of sales promotions.
Transportation Costs
Other barriers to interregional trade of meat packer <s products lie
in the area of transportation costs which are found in various licenses,
size and weight limits, taxes and reciprocity problems which are governed
by the state laws affecting transportation. Tables 6 and 7 indicate the
status of the extent of the fees and licenses of the 50 states and Canadian
Provinces as of July 1, 1962.
The chief difficulty encountered by truckers in interstate commerce
is the variance in the tax structures of the states. All of the states
have tvjo types of taxes, the fuel tax and registration fees, but because
of the great variety in their application by the states it makes it extremely
1
difficult for the carriers to comply with the different tax requirements.
The "first structure" tax, or the registration fees vary from $22.50 in
LLord, op. cit. p. 22
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Table 6. Summary of Size and Weight Limits and Reciprocity Authority
(By Regions)
NORTHEASTERN STATES & CANADIAN PROVINCES
STATE
Reciprocity authority
(Interstate or Inter-
national Carriers) Height
Lenqth In Feet Axle
Load
in lbs.
Tandem
Axle 4'
Apart
Gross Weiqht in Pounds
Truck
Troileror
>emi-Trl. T.S.T.
Other
Comb. UxleT.S.T.
4 or 5
Axlt T.S.T.
Highest Weight
Possible
Conn. Full reciprocity except
$10 P.U.C. plate(C)
12* 6" 50 50 50 N.P. 22,400
(N)
36.000 50,000
(N)
60,000
(N)
60,000
(N)
Del. Full reciprocity 13'
6"
(A)
40 40 55 60 20,000 36,000 Table Table Table
'
73,000 Max.
D. C. Full reciprocity 12"
6" 40 40 50 50 22,000 38,000 Table Toble
Table
70,000 Max.
Me. Full reciprocity except
P.U.C. lees (C)
12' 6"
(B)
55 N.R. 55 55 22,000 32,000 Table
51,800 Max.
Table
62,050 (W)
.
Table
70,550 Max.
Md. Full reciprocity (C) 12'
6''
(A)
55 55 55 55 22,400 40,000 350 (Lt 40)
850 (L f 40)
65,000 Max.
850 (L f 40)
65,000 Max.
Mass. Full reciprocity (C) N.S. 35 N.R. 50
N.P. 22,400 36,000 Table Table
73,000 Max.
Table
70,000 Max.
N. B. Full reciprocity except
P.U.C. fees (C)
12' 6" 35 35 60 60 22,000 32,000 44,000
(V)
60,000 (4 ax.)
70,000 (5 ax.)
(V)
(V)
N. H. Full reciprocity (D) 13'
6" 35 N.R. 50 50 22,400 36,000
(E)
Table
52,800 Max.
Table
66,400 Max.
Table
66,400 Max.
N.J. Full reciprocity 13'
6"
35 (FF) 50 50 22,400
(V)
32,000
(V)
Limited by
axle (V)
Limited by
oxle (V)
73,280
N. Y. Reciprocity on license.
None on mileage tax
13"
(A)
35 N.R. 50 50 22,400 36,000 34,000 f
(Lx850)
34,000 +
(Lx850)
65,000 Max.
34,000 f
(L«850)
65,000 Max.
N. S. Full reciprocity except
P.U.C. fees
13" 40 40 65 65 18,000 30,000 42,000
54,000 (4 ox.)
70,000 (5 ox.)
70,000
Ont. None to Stotes ond 13'
6" 33 N.S. 50
(KK)
50 18,000 32.000 46,000 60,000
74,000
4 ox.)
5 ax.)
84,000
Po. Full reciprocity 12'
6"
(A)
35 40 50 50 22,400 36,000 50,000
(Q)
60,000
(Q)
62,000
(F)(Q)
P.E.I. Full reciprocity except
P.U.C. fees
14' 6" 35 35 85 85 18,000
(V)
30,000
(V)
44,000
(V)
54,000 (4 ax.)
70,000 (5 ax.)
70,000
(V)
Que.
R 1
Full reciprocity except
P.U.C. fees
12' 6"
12'
6"
35
40
N.S.
40
50
50
50
50
18,000
22,400
32.000
fro
N.S.
46,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
60,000
IZ\ 70,000
88,00O(G)
Vt. Full reciprocity (H,(D) 12'
6" 50 N.R. 50
SOUTHER
50
N STATE
N.S. N.S. 50,000 (T) 60,000 (T 60,000(T)
Ala. Full reciprocity except
P.S.C. filing fee fC)
13' 6" 35 N.R. 50 N.P. 18,000
(U)
36,000 Table Toble Table
64,650 Max.
Ark. Full reciprocity (C) 13'
6"
35 N.R. 50 50 18,000
(N)
32,000 Limited by
axle wt. (N)
Limited by
oxle wt. (N)
56,000 (N)
(J)
Fla. Full reciprocity except
R.R.C fee $1.
13' 6" 40
IK)
N.R.
(FF)
55 55 20,000
(U)
40,000 Table (U) Toble (U) Table (U)
66,450 Max.
Ga. Full reciprocity (H) ex-
cept P.S.C. fee $1 (C)
13' 6" 39.5 39.5 50 50 20,340 40,680 Limited by
axle weight
Limited by
axle weight
63,280 Max.
Ky. Fullreciprocity except
certificate and permit
fees (S)(C)
13' 6"
(M)
35
(M)
N.R. 50
(M)
(KK)
50
(M)
18,000
(V)
32,000
(M)
Limited by
axle wt.(M)
Limited by
oxle wt. (M)
73,280 Max.
(M)
La. Full reciprocity 13'6" 35 N.R. 55
60 13,000 32,000 Limited by
axle weight
Limited by
axle weight
68,000
(J)
Miss. Full reciprocity except
P.S.C. fees (C)
13' 6" 35 N.S. 55 55 18,000 28,650
32,000(M
Table Toble Table
64,650 (M)
N. C. Full reciprocity (C) 12'
6"
(A)
35 N.R. 50 50 18,000
(P)
36,000 44,000
(P)
62,000
(P)
62,000
(P)
S. C. Full reciprocity except
P.S.C. fees (C)
13' 6" 40
(K)
N.R. 55
(KK)
55 20,000
(R)
32,000
(R)
Table
(R)
Toble
(R)
Table (R)
68,350 Max.
Tenn. Full reciprocity (C) 1?'
6"
(A)
35 N.R. 50 50 18,000 32,000 Table Table
Table
61,580 Max.
Texas Full reciprocity except
on intangible tax
13' 6" 35 N.R. 50 50 18,000 32,000 Table
(V)
Table
(V)
Table (V)
72,000 Max.
Va. Full reciprocity except
Corp. Comm. registration
fee $1 (C)tS)
13' 6" 35 N.R. 50 50 18,000 32,000 Table Table
Table
70,000 Max.
W. Va. Full reciprocity except
$3 P.U.C. Card (O
12' 6"
(A)
35
(V)
35
(V)
50 50 18,000
(V)
32,000
(V)
Table
(V)
Table
(V)
Table (T)(V)
60,800 Max.
Table 6. (Cont.)
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t ' '
MIDWESTERN STATES ' CANADIAN PROVINCES
STATE
Reciprocity authority
(Interstate or Inter-
national Carriers) Height
Length in Feet Axle
Load
in lbs.
Tnndem
Axle 4'
Apart
Gross Weight in Pounds
Truck
Trailer or
Semi-Trl. T.5.T.
Other
Comb. 3 AxleT.S.T.
4 or 5
Axle T.S.T.
Highest Weiqht
Possible
III. Full reciprocity except
on C. C. lee (Y) (L)
13" 6" 42 4? 55
(KK)
60 13,000 12,000 45,000 59,000
(W)
72,000 Max.
Ind. Full reciprocity except
P.S.C. Filing Fee
13' 6" 36 N.R. 50
(KK)
50 11,000
(X)
32,000 Limited by
axle loods
Limited by
axle loads
72,000 Max.
Iowa Full reciprocity
(Y) (O (L)
13' 6" 35 N.R. 50 50 13,000
(Z)
32,000
(Z)
Table
(Z)
Table
(Z)
Table (Z)
77,634 Max.
Kans. Full reciprocity
(C) (Y)
13' 6" 35 N.S. 50 50 13,000 32,000 Table Table Table
73,280 Max.
Man. Full reciprocity 13' 6" 40 N.S. 60 60 in.ogo 32,000 44,000 58,000 (M)
72,000 (M)
44,000
72,000 (M)
Mich. Full reciprocity except
P.U.C. fees (C)( Y)
13' 6" 35 40 ' 55 5 5 13,000 26,000
(1)
Limited by
axle loods
Limited by
axle loads
Limited by
axle loods
Minn. Full reciprocity 13' 6" 40 40
(FF)
50 50 18,000 32,000
(0)
Table Toble Table
72,500 Max.
Mo. Full reciprocity (Y) 12' 6"
(CC)
35 N.R. 50 50 18,000 32,000 Table Table Table
64,650 Max.
Neb. Full reciprocity (Y)(L) 13' 6" 40 (FF) 60 60 18,000
(V)
32,000
(V)
Table
(O)
Table
(0)
Table (0)
71,146 Ma,,
N. D. Reciprocity on vehicles
under 2-1,000 lbs. (Y)
13' 6" 40
(K)
N.R. 60 60 18,000 32,000 750 (L t 40) 750 (L +40) 750 (Lf- 40)
73,730 (GG)
Ohio Full reciprocity except
on mileage tox
13' 6" 35 40
(FF)
50 60 19,000 24,000
(AA)
38,000 f
(L x 900)
38,000 f
(L x 900)
38,000 »
(L x 900)
73,000 Max.
Ok la. Full reciprocity exceot
P.U.C. filing fee (C) ( Y)
13' 6" 35 N.S. 50
(KK)
50 18,000 32,000 Table Table Table
73,280 Max.
S. D. Full reciprocity (Y)(L) 13' 6" 35 N.R. 60 60 13,000 32,000 Table Table Table
73,280 Max.
Wise. Full reciprocity except
P.S.C. filing fee (Y)(L)
13' 6" 35 35
(HH)
50 50 18,000
(BB)
32,000 Table Table Table
73,000 Max.
WESTERN STATES 8. CANADIAN PROVINCES
Alaska Full reciprocity 12'6" 35 40 60 60 18,000 32,000 Table Toble
Table
76.800 Max.
Alb. Full reciprocity 13" 6" 35 N.S. 60(M) 60(M) 18,000 32,000 42,000
(V)
56,000 (V)
62,000 (M)
62,000 (M)
72,000 (M)
(V)
Aril. None 13' 6" 40 40 65 65 13,000 32,000 Table Table Toble
76,800 Max.
B. C. No reciprocal agreements 12' 6"
13' 6'TM)
35 35 50
60(M)
50
60(M)
18,000 32,000 Table Table Table
76,000(M)Max.
Calif. Full reciprocity except
Bd. of Equol. lees (Y)
13'
6"
35 40 60 65(M) 13,000 32,000 Table Table Table
76,300 Max.
Colo. Reciprocity on registra-
tion; none on P.U.C. cl
mileage tax. (Y)
\rt"
13'6"(M
35 N.R. 60 65 (M) 13,000 36,000 800 (L4-40) 800 (Lt-40) 800 (L t-40)
75,200
Idaho Authority for full re-
ciprocity but agreements
are tor proration (Y)(L)
Id' 35 N.R. 60 65 18,000 32,000 Table Table Table
76,800 Max.
Mont. Full reciprocity except
on gross operating
revenue tox (Y)
13' 6" 35 N.R. 60 65
(DD)
13,000 32,000 Toble Table Table
76,800 Max.
Nev. Reciprocity on registra-
tion fees; none on P.S.C.
fees or mileage tox (Y)
N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. 18,000 32,000 Table Table Table
76,300 Max.
N.M. Authority lor full reci-
procity; new agreements
on proration (Y)
13' 6" 40 N.R. 65 65 21,600 34,320 Table Table Table
86,400 Max.
Ore. Reciprocity on license
fees; none on P.U.C.
plotes or mileage tax (Y)
12'6"
(CO
35 35
(CO
50
(CC)
50
(CC)
18,000 32,000 Table Table Table
60,000 (T)
Sask. Reciprocity to private
carriers and movers
I3'6" 35 N.R. 60 60 18,000 32,000 44,000 58,000(4 ax.)
72,000(5 ax.)
72,000
Utah Heavy vehicles subject
to mileage tax or permits
Id' 45 45 60 65
(DD)
18,000 33,000 Table Table Toble
79,900 Max.
Wash. Reciprocity on registra-
tion fees; none on P.S.C.
and gr. wt. fees (Y)
13'6" 35 40 60 65
W)
13,000 32,000 Table Table Table (T)
72,000 Max.
Wyo. Reciprocity on registra-
tion fees; none on mile-
age tox.
13'6" 40 N.R. 65 65 18,000 36,000 Table Table Table
73,950
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Table 6. (Cont.)
(A) Automobile transporters allowed 13' 6".
(B) Load may extend lg' above maximum height.
(C) Have fuel purchase and reporting law.
(D) Requires fuel purchase reporting by vehicle owners registered in
states with fuel tax reporting laws.
'"(E) 40,000 lbs. allowed on taxdem exles of single unit when both are
drive axles.
(F) 62,000 lbs. allowed only on truck-full trailer combinations.
(G) Weight computed for 3 axle truck-3 axle trailer combinations.
(H) Vehicles from states not granting full reciprocity are assessed a
permit and trip fee.
(I) On designated highways, one pair of tandem wxles permitted 32,000
lbs.
(J) Limit only on load carrying axles-Load on steering not considered
in limits.
(K) Single units over 35 ft. must have 3 axles.
(L) Evidence of reciprocity required on vehicles.
(Li) Allowed only on designated highways.
(N) Conn. 2% tolerance on axle and gross weight.
(0) 2 successive tandem axles, limited to 60,000 lbs.
(P) 1,000 lbs. tolerance allowed on any one axlej % tolerance on
gross weight.
(Q) % tolerance allowed.
(R) 10£ tolerance allowed on gross weight (administered also on axles).
(S) Trucks with 3 axles and all tractors assessed additional road tax
of 2$ per gal. on all fuel used.
(T) May secure permit for weight up to 73,280 in T,"J. Va., no tolerance
allowed; W. Va. Commission has designated Roads for 70,000 lbs. up to 76,000
in Oregon; up to 76,000 in Washington on certified routes. 52,800 on 3 axles,
66,400 on 4 or more axles allowed on Vt. State Highways only.
(U) 10^ tolerance allowed.
(V) 55o tolerance allowed.
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Table 6. (Cont.)
(V7) 111. - 5 axle T.S.T. - 72,000 lbs. Maine - 5 axle T.S.T. - 70,550 lbs.
(X) 22,400 lbs. axle permitted on roads designated by Highway Commission.
(Y) Have fleet reciprocity by apportioning license fees.
(Z) 8% tolerance on total gross weight or groups of axles; 3% on single
or tandem axles.
(AA) 31,500 lbs. allowed on axles over 4 ft. apart.
(BB) 1,500 lbs. tolerance on single axle.
(CC) Ore. State Highway Commission may grant annual permits for height up
to 13' 6"; simi length to 40'; T.S.T. length to 60«; other combination
length to 65* • Ho. grants permits for height to 13' 6".
(DD) Permit needed for 65*.
(FF) Llinn. & Neb. - 40' on trailers, N.R. on semi-trailers; Ohio - 35'
on trailers, 40« on semi-trailers; Fla. & K.J. - 35 1 on trailers, N.R.
on semi-trailers.
(GG) Need approved on all equipment over 64,000 lbs.
(HH) Semi-trailer length measured from extreme rear of tractor chasis to
rear of trailer.
(II) Que. - Floating axles 14,000 lbs. - tandem on trailers or semi-trailers
30,000 lbs.
(KK) 60' for auto transporters in 111., Ind. S. C. and Ontario; 55' in KJT.
N.R. - No restriction.
N.P. - Not permitted.
N.S. - Not specified
T.S.T. - Tractor semi-trailer
.
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Table 7. Tables for Allowable Loads (In 1,000 lbs.)
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one state to $1,139.00 in another state for the same type of vehicle.
The gas tax, or the "second structure" tax, varies among the states from
3? to 7£. Another form of taxation, the "third structure" tax or "use"
tax, has presented many new problems of its own.
An interview conducted by the USDA disclosed that small carriers
found it difficult to keep informed as to the forms and amounts of taxes
the various states were requiring. The carriers stated that the "use"
tax itself was not so much of an economic handicap but the fines for non-
compliance due to lack of knowledge or understanding of the various require-
ments presented a financial burden to them.
Also in this connection, the small motor carriers stated that their
size of business was limited because the operation of more than two trucks
made it necessary to hire an accountant to fill out the large number of
reports requested by the states. It was further charged by the motor carriers
that the cost of collectii^ the tax exceeded the amount of the tax collected.
The size and weight limitations imposed by the states adds to the
difficulty of the truckers in interstate commerce. Tables 6 and 7 give a
comprehensive review of the specifications of the allowable limits for
each state. As before, the principle difficulty stems from the variety of
regulations in this area.
In general, the barriers to interregional trade in the area of trans-
portation rest with the fact that not only is there a cost for transporting
a meat packers' product into or through a state but that the charges are
substantially varied in the amount. This added cost of transportation has
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Transportation and Facilities Research
Division
.
Effects of State and Local Regulations on Interstate Movement of
Agricultural Products by Highway
. Marketing Research Report No. 496".—JuTv
1961. p. 97.
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the same effect as a tariff on the product which tends to either raise the
price of the product or lessen the profit of the producer. The net result
of the added cost of entering the state are as follows; (1) the meat packers
located in a state have a cost advantage over meat products that are required
to cross that state's boundaries because of the additional cost of entering
the state, and (2) because of the great disparity in the amounts of the
additional cost to enter a state the meat packers in the relatively higher
entry-cost states have an even greater advantage because not only are
"foreign" meat products proportionately higher than in other states, other
things being equal, but the meat products of the packers in the higher
entry-cost states are porportionately lower in the lower entry-cost states.
In other words, the packers in the higher entry-cost states can compete
relatively effectively in all states, whereas the packers in the low
entry-cost states can compete relatively effectively only in other low entry-
cost states. To this end, then, it is a locational advantage to produce in
a high entry-cost state because of the relatively higher "tariff" for
"importing" the product into that state. But nevertheless, when taken as a
whole, the additional cost or "tariff" is a real and costly barrier to
interregional trade of meat packers' products.
Of course the Utopian solution to the local "tariff" or barrier to
transportation can be found by gaining full and complete reciprocity between
the states. The problem would not be solved to its full extent by having
the federal government deal with this question through its interstate
commerce powers because trucks used one week for interstate commerce may
be used the following week for intra-state commerce.
Reciprocity is the granting of privilsges by one state to vehicles or
owners of vehicles v/hen such vehicles are properly registered in another
63
state that grants similar privileges. The reason most states do not grant
reciprocity is because it is assumed it would reduce the revenue of the
state. However, it is economically feasible to grant full reciprocity
according to New Hampshire's Governor Blood after his state has granted
reciprocity for two years;
I believe that the result of the reciprocity biH, passed at
the last session of the legislature, indicates that, although the
state will lose approximately $200,000 from registration fees, there
is undoubtedly other revenue which, in addition to the great benefit
that it has rendered not only to our truckmen but to the truckmen of
other states, will justify the continuation of this legislation.
New Hampshire received additional benefits, increased revenue
from fuel taxes paid by out-of-state users of the highways and the
two years' trial period of reciprocity became law.
It is the hope of all engaged in interstate commerce that other states
will soon follow New Hampshire's standard of full reciprocity, rjhen full
reciprocity between the states occurs, a major barrier to interregional
trade and meat packing plant location will be eliminated.
Harry S. Boot, Motor Truck Reciprocity
, American Trucking Associations,
Inc. p. 1. ••
'Tbid., p. 5.
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SUIMAKI AND .CONCLUSIONS
It was the purpose of this study to discover and describe the legal
and institutional barriers to interregional trade and meat packing plant
location, as part of Project NC1I 25. A search of the Kansas State University
library and the State Legislative Library in Topeka, Kansas, was made in
addition to questionnaires sent to both private industry and public offices
of state and federal agencies.
Most of the authors writing in the field of locational economics
agree that the dominant characteristics of plant location are : (1) materials
used in production; (2) means of transportation; (3) nearness to markets;
(4) quantity and quality of labor; (5) power and fuels; and, (6) the
availability of desirable sites. A survey of national meat packing companies
revealed that barriers to plant location and interregional trade may be
roughly categorized into three classes: (1) economic and physical factors;
(2) symptons of a bad business climate; and, (3) the lack of uniformity of
the food laws and other differing regulations of the states. The federal
farm programs were shown to effect changes in meat packing plant location
because of the types of crops farmers were discouraged and encourage to
raise.
The structure of the meat industry has changed between 1955 and I960
with most sections of the United States showing a decrease in the number
of meat packing plants. Possible barriers confront potentialy building
meat packers due to an unawareness of long-run shifts in livestock pro-
duction and meat consumption. Other general barriers confronted meat
packers in the form of varied city ordinances, e.g. zoning regulations,
and higher wage costs in certain areas of the United States due to the
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activity of labor unions.
Federal barriers tend to uniformly affect the meat industry as a
whole relative to other competitors in the meat industry. The forms of
barriers imposed by the federal government are found in: (1) possible
high costs involved in building and equipping a meat packing plant in
order to obtain LID approval so that the meat products can be sold in inter-
state commerce; (2) federally controlled freight rates are not uniform
and thereby cause transportation costs to be higher in one location than
another; (3) the federal government has prohibited further vertical
integration of some meat packers, thereby preventing them from achieving
greater economies of scale that are enjoyed by the competitors of the
meat industry; (4) smaller meat packers may be at a disadvantage because
it is questionable if the USDA can effectively police price discrimination
in the meat industry; (5) because the federal government can prevent meat
packers from polluting streams with their effluent it may force some meat
packers to build their own sewage facilities.
Barriers to meat packers imposed by states are derived primarily
from the differences in the state requirements. The principle differences
in the varying state requirements are embodied in: (1) bonds required
of meat packers to insure payment to producers are found in only nine
states; (2) a major difference among the states is found in: a) the per
cent of the cost of meat inspection that is paid by the state; b) v/hether
the inspection is voluntary or mandatory; c) the type and extent of food
laws, tax inducements and laws regulating sales promotions in the states.
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ABSTRACT
As part of Project NCM 25 the goal of this study was to find the
legal and institutional barriers to interregional trade and neat packing
plant location. The information used in this paper was obtained from;
(1) the Kansas State University library; (2) the State Legislative Library
in Topeka, Kansas; and, (3) letters and questionnaires sent to persons
in private industry and state and federal agencies.
The management personnel of meat packing companies stated that there
were several barriers in interregional trade and meat packing plant that
can be classed into three categories: (1) economic and physical factors;
(2) symptoms of a bad business climate; and, (3) the lack of uniformity of
the food laws and other differing regulations of the states. The federal
farm programs were also shown to effect changes in meat packing plant
location because of the types of crops farmers were discouraged and
encouraged to raise.
The structure of the meat industry had changed between 1955 and i960
with most sections of the United States showing a decrease in the number
of meat packing plants. Possible barriers confront potentially building
meat packers due to an unawareness of long-run shifts in livestock pro-
duction and meat consumption. Other general barriers confronted meat
packers in the form of various city ordinances and higher wage costs in
certain areas of the United States due to the activity of labor unions.
Federal enactments tend to uniformily affect the meat industry as
a whole relative to other competitors of the meat industry. The forms
of barriers imposed by the federal government are found in: (1) possible
high costs involved in building and equipping a meat packing plant in order
to obtain Meat Inspection Division approval so that the meat products
can be sold in interstate commerce; (2) federally controlled freight
rates are not uniform and thereby cause transportation costs to be higher
in one location than another; (3) the federal government has prohibited
further vertical integration of some meat packers, thereby preventing
them from achieving greater economies of scale that are enjoyed by the
competitors of the meat industry; (4) smaller meat packers may be at a
disadvantage because it is questionable if the USDA can effectively police
price discrimination in the meat industry; (5) because the federal govern-
ment can prevent meat packers from polluting streams with their effluent
it may force some meat packers to build their own sewage facilities.
Barriers to meat packers imposed by states are derived primarily
from the differences in the state requirements. The principal differences
in the varying state requirements are embodied in: (1) bonds required
of meat packers to insure payment to producers are found in only nine
states; (2) a major difference among the states is found in: a) the
per cent of the cost of meat inspection that is paid by the state; b)
whether the inspection is voluntary or mandatory; c) the type and extent
of food laws, tax inducements and laws regulating sales promotions in
the states.
